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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW – ENDANGERED SPECIES:
INTERPRETING THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT
AND ITS PROHIBITION AGAINST THE
“TAKING” OF PROTECTED BIRDS
United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P.,
840 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (D.N.D. 2012)
ABSTRACT
In United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., the United States District
Court of North Dakota refused to adopt an expansive interpretation of the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) and held that oil and gas companies’
use of reserve pits, which resulted in the deaths of numerous protected
birds, did not fall under the prohibitions of the MBTA. The court expressly
found “take,” within the context of the statutory language of the MBTA,
refers to conduct directed at birds, such as hunting and poaching, not acts or
omissions having the incidental or unintended effect of causing bird deaths.
As a result, oil development and production activities, which incidentally
kill protected birds, do not fall under the MBTA’s prohibitions. Although
this decision does not constitute new case law regarding the applicability of
the MBTA, it is significant because it expands the holding of existing
Eighth Circuit precedent to exclude commercial activity by oil and gas
producers from the prohibitions of the MBTA. The decision also
contributes to the disagreement among the circuit courts regarding the
proper scope of the MBTA.
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FACTS

In 2011, United States Fish and Wildlife Service (the Service) agents
discovered a variety of dead migratory birds located near three different
reserve pits owned by three oil and gas companies operating in North

2012]

CASE COMMENT

845

Dakota’s Williston Basin.1 These reserve pits, which are regulated by
North Dakota law,2 were allegedly contaminated with oil and other byproducts of oil and gas drilling operations and were not properly fenced at
the time the dead birds were found.3 As a result, the federal government
charged Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P. (Brigham Oil), Newfield Production
Company (Newfield Production), and Continental Resources, Inc.
(Continental Resources), with violating the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
(MBTA)4 for their respective “takings” of migratory birds.5
The federal government filed Informations against each company with
the United States District Court of North Dakota.6 The allegations
contained in the Informations stated the companies “without being
permitted to do so . . . did take migratory birds . . . in violation of the
[MBTA].”7 On the same day the federal government filed the Informations
against the companies, it also filed separate Requests for Summons and
Issuances of Arrest Warrants for Brigham Oil, Newfield Production, and
Continental Resources.8

1. United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1203, 1205-06 (D.N.D.
2012).
2. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-02(15) (2004) (A reserve pit is defined as “an excavated
area used to contain drill cuttings accumulated during oil and gas drilling operations and mudladen oil and gas drilling fluids used to confine oil, gas, or water to its native strata during the
drilling of an oil and gas well.”); N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 43-02-03-19.1 (2011) (“All pits and ponds
which contain oil must be fenced, screened, and netted.”).
3. Affidavit for Issuance of Arrest Warrant or Summons at 2, 7, United States v. Brigham Oil
& Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (D.N.D. 2012) (No. 4:11-po-005), No. 4:11-po-00005-DLH
[hereinafter Affidavit for Brigham Oil]. But see Affidavit for Issuance of Arrest Warrant or
Summons at 8, United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (D.N.D. 2012)
(No. 4:11-po-005), No. 4:11-po-00009-DLH [hereinafter Affidavit for Newfield Production]. The
Government brought separate charges against Newfield Production because one of the company’s
reserve pits overflowed into a nearby coulee and wetland area, where four “dead and oiled”
migratory birds were later found. Affidavit for Newfield Production, supra note, at 8. As a result,
the charges brought against Newfield Production were silent as to whether the reserve pit was
properly netted at the time the dead birds were found. See id.
4. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (2006).
5. Brigham Oil, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1204-06. On May 6, 2011, Brigham Oil was charged for
taking two mallards. Id. at 1204-05. On May 18-19, 2011, Newfield Production was charged for
taking two mallards, one a northern pintail and the other a ring-necked duck. Id. at 1205. On May
6, 2011, Continental Resources was charged with taking one Say’s Phoebe. Id. at 1206.
6. Id. at 1204-06.
7. See Information, United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (D.N.D.
2012) (No. 4:11-po-005), 2011 WL 8318111 [hereinafter Information-Brigham Oil]; Information,
United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (D.N.D. 2012) (No. 4:11-po005), 2011 WL 6258223 [hereinafter Information-Newfield Production]; Information, United
States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (D.N.D. 2012) (No. 4:11-po-005), 2011
WL 8318120 [hereinafter Information-Continental Resources]. The Information documents filed
against Newfield Production and Continental Resources were virtually identical to the Brigham
Oil Information, except for the dates of the charged offense and the list of the birds taken.
8. Brigham Oil, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1204-06.

846

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 88:843

Each Request for Summons and Issuance of an Arrest Warrant
consisted of a Statement of Probable Cause (Statement) by Richard A.
Grosz, Special Agent for the the Service who inspected the reserve pits.9
The Statements provided detailed summaries of the allegations against the
companies and assessed the migratory birds’ likely causes of death.10 In
addition, the Statements also discussed the chemicals generally found in
reserve pits, the tendencies of migratory birds to interact with reserve pits,
and the companies’ past violations for similar acts.11 According to the
Statements, Special Agent Grosz determined the deaths of the migratory
birds found near the reserve pits of Brigham Oil, Newfield Productions, and
Continental Resources were likely caused as a “result of exposure to the
contents of the oil reserve pit.”12
The oil companies brought motions to dismiss the charges against
them.13 The companies argued ascribing strict liability to behavior “that
indirectly results in the death of migratory birds” would “stretch [the
MBTA] far beyond the bounds of reason” and that the MBTA “does not,
and was never meant to, criminalize the commercial activity of a legitimate
business that incidentally and indirectly injures or kills a migratory bird.”14
Instead, the oil companies argued the court should to interpret the MBTA’s
ambiguous terms “take” and “kill” to apply only to “physical conduct of the
sort engaged in by hunters and poachers,” not commercial activity that
indirectly results in the deaths of migratory birds.15
9. Id.
10. Affidavit for Brigham Oil, supra note 3, at 7; see also Affidavit for Newfield Production,
supra note 3, at 8-9. In 2008, Brigham Oil, Newfield Production, and Continental Resources all
were issued Violation Notices and fined in North Dakota after the the Service retrieved dead and
oiled migratory birds from the companies’ respective reserve pits. See Affidavit for Brigham Oil,
supra note 3, at 4; Affidavit for Newfield Production, supra note 3, at 5; Affidavit for Issuance of
Arrest Warrant, United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (D.N.D. 2012)
(No. 4:11-po-005 ), No. 4:11-po-00004-DLH [hereinafter Affidavit for Continental Resources]. A
letter from the Service accompanied the violation notice informing the companies of possible
measures that could be taken to “prevent wildlife mortality” for future operations. See, e.g.,
Affidavit for Brigham Oil, supra note 3, at 4-5.
11. Affidavit for Brigham Oil, supra note 3, at 2-4; Affidavit for Newfield Production, supra
note 3, at 2-5; Affidavit for Continental Resources, supra note 10, at 2-5.
12. Affidavit for Brigham Oil, supra note 3, at 7.
13. Defendants Brigham Oil and Newfield Production’s Joint Memorandum of Law in
Support of Motion to Dismiss the Informations at 1, United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P.,
840 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (D.N.D. 2012) (No. 4:11-po-005), 2011 WL 6258226 [hereinafter Brigham
Oil and Newfield Production’s Joint Motion to Dismiss]; see also Continental Resources
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 1, United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P.,
840 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (D.N.D. 2012) (No. 4:11-po-005), 2011 WL 8318178 [hereinafter
Continental Resources’ Motion to Dismiss].
14. Brigham Oil and Newfield Production’s Joint Motion to Dismiss, supra note 13, at 1, 3
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
15. Id. at 11 (citations and quotations omitted); see also Continental Resources’ Motion to
Dismiss, supra note 13, at 12 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
As a result of advances in horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing
technology, which allows the mass exploration of the country’s “virtually
untouched shale and tight oil fields,” the United States has experienced an
“explosion” in domestic oil production in the last decade.16 Although oil
production from shale and tight oil fields is “still in its infancy,” there has
been an unexpected surge of oil production from the Bakken shale
formation in North Dakota where production has risen from “a few barrels
in 2006 to more than 530,000 barrels in December 2011.”17 According to
expert studies, it is estimated the total amount of original oil in place (OOP)
in the Bakken formation could be as high as 503 billion barrels – placing
the Bakken formation “ahead of the largest oil basins in the world.”18
Although this drastic expansion of oil and gas production activities has
proven to be extremely beneficial for North Dakota in financial terms,19
state and federal authorities have been forced to address the consequences
of the increased oil and gas production activity, especially the
environmental consequences.20 Through various agencies, including the
Service, the federal government has increased its enforcement efforts under
the MBTA and criminally prosecuted industrial and commercial activities,
such as oil and gas production, that directly or indirectly results in the
deaths of migratory birds.21 The United States Courts of Appeals have
issued various interpretations of the MBTA and have remained divided in
regard to determining the proper scope of the MBTA and its prohibitions.22
This Part will briefly discuss the background and legislative history of
the MBTA.23 Then it will analyze the statutory language of the MBTA’s
16. Leonardo Maugeri, Oil: The Next Revolution: The Unprecedented Upsurge of Oil
Production Capacity and What it Means for the World, BELFER CTR FOR SCI. & INT’L AFFS.,
HARV. KENNEDY SCH., June 2012, at 2.
17. Id. at 2, 8.
18. Id. at 47. In 1999, Leigh Price, a U.S. Geological Service geochemist, completed “the
most comprehensive assessment of the Bakken,” which estimated the Bakken formation contained
between “271 billion and 503 billion barrels, with a mean of 413.” Id. In 2011, Continental
Resources estimated the formation contained 500 billion barrels of OOP. Id.
19. “Oil extraction and gross production tax revenues for 2011 were $1,296.1 million,
representing a 73% increase from 2010.” N.D. Petroleum Council, Facts and Figures, N.D. OIL,
www.ndoil.org/cache/Facts_and_Figures_2012_6.5.pdf (last updated June 5, 2012).
20. James MacPherson, Industry: New N.D. Oil Rules Could Curb Drilling, WDAY NEWS
(Mar. 15, 2012, 10:27 AM), http://www.wday.com/event/article/id/60636/. On April 1, 2012, new
regulations became effective in order to limit liquid waste pits at well sites. Id.; see also Steve
Hargreaves, Obama Tightens Oil and Gas Drilling Regulations, CNN MONEY (Apr. 18, 2012,
2:45 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/04/18/news/economy/drilling-regulations/index.htm.
21. KEVIN A. GAYNOR ET AL., AM. LAW INST., RECENT DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE
MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT 307 (2012).
22. See discussion infra Part II.B.
23. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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prohibitions and penalties associated with the unlawful taking of migratory
birds.24 Finally, this Part will examine the circuit court split regarding the
narrow and broad interpretation and application of the MBTA.25
A. OVERVIEW OF THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT
AND ITS PROHIBITIONS
Although the MBTA has been described as “one of the pioneering
federal wildlife statutes” in efforts to protect migratory birds, there has been
a longstanding debate concerning the interpretation and application of the
MBTA and its prohibitions.26 When the MBTA was introduced on the floor
of the United States House of Representatives, opponents and proponents of
the Act engaged in spirited debates over the passage of, and the need for,
federal legislative efforts like the MBTA to protect migratory birds.27
Today, courts around the country remain deeply divided in their
interpretations of the MBTA and have been unable to reach a consensus in
determining the scope of the MBTA’s prohibitions.28
1.

The Genesis of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act

One of the nation’s oldest conservation statutes,29 the MBTA was
enacted by Congress and signed into law on July 3, 1918.30 The MBTA
was initially adopted in response to an agreement between the United States
and Great Britain, on behalf of Canada.31 Subsequent treaties between the
United States, Mexico, Japan, and the Soviet Union were later implemented
through amendments to the MBTA.32 The MBTA was motivated by the
24. See discussion infra Part II.A.
25. See discussion infra Part II.B-C.
26. Craig D. Sjostrom, Comment, Of Birds and Men: The Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 26
IDAHO L. REV. 371, 372 (1990) (discussing the need to amend the MBTA in order to codify a
broader interpretation of the Act). See generally George Cameron Coggins & Sebastian T. Patti,
The Resurrection and Expansion of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 50 U. COLO. L. REV. 165, 16974 (1979) (discussing the history and expansion of the MBTA and its prohibitions).
27. See discussion infra Part II.A.1.
28. See discussion infra Part II.B.
29. United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1122 (10th Cir. 2002); see also United States
v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d. 1070, 1080 (D. Colo. 1999) (describing the
enactment of the original MBTA).
30. Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, ch. 128, § 2, 40 Stat. 755, 755 (codified as amended
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (2006)).
31. Convention Between the United States and Great Britain (for Canada) for the Protection
of Migratory Birds, U.S.-Gr. Brit, Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702.
32. Convention Between the United States of America and Mexico for the Protection of
Migratory Birds and Game Mammals, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 7, 1936, 50 Stat. 1311; Convention
Between the Government of the United State of America and the Government of Japan for the
Protection of Migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of Extinction, and Their Environment, U.S.Japan, Mar. 4, 1974, 25 U.S.T. 3329.
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efforts to prevent the extinction of numerous species of migratory birds and
sought to protect the migratory birds covered by the various treaties,
primarily through the regulation of hunting.33
Prior to the passage of the original MBTA, Congress fiercely debated
one of the most controversial aspects of the MBTA – the scope of its
protection.34
Proponents of the MBTA focused primarily on the
agricultural and economic benefits derived from migratory birds and
insisted it was necessary to not only protect “migratory game birds,” but
“insectivorous migratory birds” as well.35 In addition, Congress recognized
the “aesthetic value of migratory birds” and emphasized the need for
preservation efforts.36 As a result, the MBTA was written to ensure that the
federal government would protect and preserve both the economic and
aesthetic value of migratory birds.37 Proponents argued the MBTA’s broad
powers were needed to ensure effective enforcement and assured the
MBTA’s reach would be limited through “prosecutorial discretion and
judicial lenity.”38
Opponents of the MBTA generally did not dispute the claims focusing
on the economic value of migratory birds, nor did they deny the need for
conservation efforts.39 Instead, opponents argued the MBTA violated
states’ rights under the Constitution,40 and feared the MBTA’s reach would
extend to all general killings of birds.41 In addition, opponents were

33. Hardman, 297 F.3d at 1121; see also Coggins & Patti, supra note 26, at 169-74
(summarizing the terms of the various treaties).
34. Larry Martin Corcoran & Elinor Colbourn, Shocked, Crushed and Poisoned: Criminal
Enforcement in Non-Hunting Cases Under the Migratory Bird Treaties, 77 DENV. U. L. REV. 359,
368 (1999).
35. 56 CONG. REC. 7360-61 (1918) (statement of Rep. Stedman) (arguing the importance of
both “migratory game birds” and “insectivorous migratory birds”); id. at 7363 (statement of Rep.
Cooper) (emphasizing the importance of regulating hunting).
36. Id. at 7458 (statement of Rep. Smith).
37. Id.
38. Corcoran & Colbourn, supra note 34, at 368; see also 56 CONG. REC. 7441 (1918)
(statement of Rep. Miller) (“No man can say that the power given to the game wardens . . . is ever
used in a way that violates unnecessarily the rights of man.”); id. at 7444 (statement of Rep.
Dowell) (stating punishment will be solely a matter for the courts).
39. Corcoran & Colbourn, supra note 34, at 367.
40. 56 CONG. REC. 7363 (1918) (statement of Rep. Tillman) (arguing that the MBTA is “a
radical interference with the rights of the State.”); see also id. at 7445 (statement of Rep. Bland)
(questioning the constitutionality of delegation of authority to define illegal actions by regulation).
41. Id. at 7364 (statement of Rep. Huddleston) (discussing the possibility of allowing “a
thoughtless boy that may rob a bird’s nest or may kill a robin to be haled before a court, sent to
jail, or fined the heavy fine provided in this bill.”); id. at 7449 (statement of Rep. Caraway); id. at
7450-51 (statement of Rep. Mondell); id. at 7452 (statement of Rep. Huddleston).
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concerned with the “warrantless search provisions” of the MBTA as it was
originally proposed.42
After modifying the MBTA to require search warrants, Congress
enacted the MBTA into law in 1918.43 Shortly after, the MBTA’s
constitutionality was first challenged in Missouri v. Holland,44 where the
State of Missouri argued the MBTA violated the Tenth Amendment’s
reservation of states’ rights.45 In defending the constitutionality of the
MBTA against Missouri’s Tenth Amendment challenge, Justice Holmes
“declared the protection of migratory birds to be a ‘national interest’
warranting ‘national action.’”46 Today, the MBTA has taken the role of a
regulatory device for implementing and amending provisions deemed
necessary to protect “migratory birds”47 and their environment.48
2.

Statutory Analysis of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act

Compared to other federal wildlife legislation, the MBTA is “short,
succinct, and comprehensive” and its main operative provisions are
contained in 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-704.49 Section 703(a) states “[u]nless and
except as permitted by regulations . . . it shall be unlawful at any time, by
any means or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, [or] kill, . . . any
migratory bird . . . .”50 Despite the seemingly basic nature of this
congressional sanction against “harmful and contributory” human activities,
the MBTA and its prohibitions against harming birds in “any means or in
any manner” are comprehensive measures intended to protect migratory
birds.51 Although the MBTA’s statutory language is comprehensive, the
MBTA does not directly define the term “take.”52 As a result, courts

42. Corcoran & Colbourn, supra note 34, at 368; see also 56 CONG. REC. 7440-61 (1918).
Opponents warned that federal officers “will pin the bottom of an oyster can upon their coats and
invade the homes of free citizens.” Id. at 7449 (statement of Rep. Caraway); id. at 7447
(statement of Rep. Tillman) (“Such a person may come with the end of a tomato can appended to
the lapel of his coat as his badge of authority . . . .”).
43. Corcoran & Colbourn, supra note 34, at 368.
44. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
45. Holland, 252 U.S. at 431.
46. See Hye-Jong Linda Lee, The Pragmatic Migratory Bird Treaty Act: Protecting
“Property,” 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 649, 655 (2004) (citing Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S.
416, 434-35 (1920)).
47. 50 C.F.R. §§ 10.12 to .13 (2011).
48. See Lee, supra note 46, at 653.
49. Coggins & Patti, supra note 26, at 174.
50. 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2006). Regulations authorized by the MBTA have defined, “take” to
mean, “to pursue, hunt, shoot, kill, trap, capture, or collect.” 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (2011).
51. Coggins & Patti, supra note 26, at 175; see also 16 U.S.C. § 703.
52. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712.
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disagree as to what type of conduct or activity constitutes an unlawful
taking under the MBTA.53
The MBTA imposes both misdemeanor and felony criminal penalties
on any taking of a migratory bird.54 Section 707(a) of the MBTA specifies
“any person . . . who shall violate any provisions of . . . this
subchapter . . . shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon
conviction thereof shall be fined not more than $15,000 or be imprisoned
not more than six months, or both.”55 Unlike a felony offense, a
misdemeanor conviction under the MBTA is considered a strict liability
offense, in which “no knowledge is required.”56
Where no exception applies and no permit has been obtained, 16
U.S.C. § 707(b) provides “[w]hoever, in violation of this subchapter shall
knowingly (1) take by any manner whatsoever any migratory bird . . . or (2)
sell, offer for sale, [or] barter . . . any migratory bird shall be guilty of a
felony . . . .”57 The types of activities that can be considered for felony
convictions are more limited than the activities that can be considered for
misdemeanor convictions.58 Felony convictions under 16 U.S.C. § 707(b)
are reserved for activities involving elements of commerce and
knowledge.59
Historically, criminal prosecutions under the MBTA focused on
activities associated with hunting and poaching.60 Beginning in the 1970s,
this changed when federal prosecutors and private citizens brought cases
involving activities such as timber harvest, pesticide use, and the
maintenance of power poles.61 Today, the question of whether the MBTA
can be interpreted to address non-hunting activity that indirectly results in
the taking of migratory birds has been left undecided.62
B. CASE LAW DEVELOPMENT OF THE SCOPE OF
THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT
Perhaps the most significant issue in MBTA case law is whether the
term “take.” as used in 16 U.S.C. § 703(a), includes incidental takings of
53. See GAYNOR ET AL., supra note 21, at 308-09.
54. See 16 U.S.C. § 707.
55. Id. § 707(a).
56. Corcoran & Colbourn, supra note 34, at 377 (citing United States v. Reese, 27 F. Supp.
833, 835 (W.D. Tenn. 1939)).
57. 16 U.S.C. § 707(b).
58. Corcoran & Colbourn, supra note 34, at 375.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 385.
61. Id. at 385-86.
62. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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migratory birds, or is restricted to conduct engaged in by hunters and
poachers.63 The circuit courts are split as to whether there is criminal
liability under the MBTA when the taking of a migratory bird is not the
result of an intentional, affirmative act targeted at migratory birds.64 For
example, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have refused to extend the MBTA’s
scope beyond “physical conduct of the sort engaged in by hunters and
poachers.”65 However, the Tenth Circuit has embraced an interpretation of
the MBTA prohibiting all takings of migratory birds, and declined to adopt
the approach of the other courts limiting MBTA violations to those caused
only by “purposeful” activities.66
1.

Restrictive Interpretations of “Taking” Under the MBTA

In the following cases, courts have narrowed the scope of the MBTA
and refused to apply a strict liability standard for unlawful takings of
migratory birds.67 These courts determined the MBTA’s penalty provisions
and implementing regulations “are limited in their intended scope to the
types of activities engaged in by hunters and poachers, and do not extend to
other acts that indirectly or unintentionally cause the death of migratory
birds.”68 As a result, these courts determined lawful commercial activities
that are not associated with hunting or poaching, such as logging and oil
production activities, do not constitute takings under the MBTA.69
In Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans,70 the Ninth Circuit explored the
meaning of the MBTA and narrowly interpreted it to apply only to
affirmative conduct, such as conduct engaged in by hunters and poachers,
directed specifically at migratory birds.71 Here, the Ninth Circuit addressed
the Seattle Audubon Society’s attempt to block a logging company from
harvesting trees in an area that served as the habitat to the northern spotted
owl, and rejected the notion that “logging of old-growth timber, which
63. GAYNOR ET AL., supra note 21, at 310.
64. Id.
65. See Newton Cnty. Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 115 (8th Cir. 1997);
Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 302 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the MBTA’s
prohibition against killing protected birds did not extend to logging timber from lands that may
provide suitable habitats for northern spotted owls).
66. See generally United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 685 (10th Cir. 2010)
(“As a matter of statutory construction, the ‘take’ provision of the MBTA does not contain a
scienter requirement.”).
67. See infra pp. 118-21.
68. James Lockhart, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 703 to 712, and its Implementing Regulations, 3 A.L.R. FED. 2D
465, 517 (2005).
69. United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1210 (D.N.D. 2012).
70. 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991).
71. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 952 F.2d at 302-03.
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adversely affects owl habitat, constitutes a violation of the MBTA.”72
Instead, the court held the term “take,” applies only to direct and physical
conduct, such as hunting and poaching, which is directed at migratory
birds.73
Another case repeating the trend of narrowly interpreting the MBTA to
exclude indirect or unintentional acts causing death to migratory birds, is
Newton County Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Service.74 In Newton County,
the Newton County Wildlife Association brought an action against the
Forest Service seeking to enjoin timber sales that allegedly violated the
MBTA.75 The Wildlife Association argued logging activities, which disrupt
the nesting of migratory birds and often result in their death, violated the
MBTA’s “absolute prohibition” against killing or taking of migratory
birds.76 However, the Eighth Circuit found “[s]trict liability may be
appropriate when dealing with hunters and poachers,” but it would “stretch
[the MBTA] far beyond the bounds of reason to construe it as an absolute
criminal prohibition on conduct, such as timber harvesting, that indirectly
results in the deaths of migratory birds.”77 Further, the court agreed with
the Ninth Circuit that the ambiguous terms “take” and “kill” in 16 U.S.C. §
703 mean “physical conduct of the sort engaged in by hunters and
poachers.”78
In United States v. Ray Westall Operating, Inc.,79 the United States
District Court for the District of New Mexico decided oil production
activities, like logging activities, which can result in direct and indirect
takings of migratory birds, are exempt from the prohibitions of the
MBTA.80 In Westall Operating, fifty dead birds were discovered in the
operator’s oil evaporation pit.81 The evaporation pit was netted to ensure
birds would not access the pit, but a technical malfunction caused the pit to
overflow above the level of the netting, allowing migratory birds to come in
contact with the contents of the pit.82 As a result of exposure to the
contents in the evaporation pit, numerous migratory birds died.83

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 299.
Id. at 303.
113 F.3d 110 (8th Cir. 1997).
Newton Cnty. Wildlife Ass’n, 113 F.3d at 112.
Id. at 115.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
No. CR 05-1516-MV, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130674 (D.N.M. Feb. 25, 2009).
Ray Westall Operating, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130674, at *19.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id.
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Nevertheless, the court reversed a previous decision finding Westall
Operating guilty of taking migratory birds in violation of the MBTA.84 In
its decision, the court applied the logic used by the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits and concluded “Congress intended to prohibit only conduct
directed towards birds and did not intend to criminalize negligent acts or
omissions that are not directed at birds, but which incidentally and
proximately cause bird deaths.”85
Therefore, Westall Operating’s
negligence that allowed the overflow of the evaporation and resulted in the
death of protected birds, did not subject the company to liability under the
MBTA.86
2.

Expansive Interpretations of “Taking” Under the MBTA

In the following cases, various courts have ruled to adopt a broad
interpretation of the scope of the MBTA and its prohibitions.87 Rather than
limiting the reach of the MBTA to only activities normally exhibited by
hunters and poachers, these courts have expanded the reach of the MBTA to
any activities resulting in the unintentional taking or killing of migratory
birds.88 Under these decisions, courts have found activities such as
pesticide application89 and maintenance of power lines90 fall within the
scope of the MBTA when they result in unintentional deaths of migratory
birds.91 Rather than require proof of intent to take or kill migratory birds,
these courts have found violations of the MBTA are subject to strict
criminal liability.92
In 1978, in United States v. Corbin Farm Service,93 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of California expressly found that
activity other than that associated with hunting or poaching, which resulted
in the unintentional takings or killings of migratory birds, falls within the
scope of the MBTA.94 In Corbin, the government charged the defendant
with unlawfully taking ten protected birds as a result of incorrectly applying
pesticides to an alfalfa field.95 The court analyzed the statutory language of
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at *20.
Id. at *19.
Id. at *20.
See infra pp. 122-25.
Id.
See United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 514 (E.D. Cal. 1978).
See United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1071 (D. Colo. 1999).
Id. at 1074.
Id. at 1084.
444 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Cal. 1978).
Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. at 540.
Id. at 515.

2012]

CASE COMMENT

855

16 U.S.C. § 703, which states it shall be unlawful “by any means or in any
manner” to take migratory birds, and held “it is sufficient to declare that the
MBTA can be constitutionally applied to impose criminal penalties on
those who did not intend to kill migratory birds.”96 Therefore, the court
found the defendant was strictly liable under the MBTA for unlawfully
taking protected birds by his accidental poisoning.97
Shortly after, in United States v. FMC Corp.,98 the Second Circuit
affirmed a corporate pesticide manufacturer’s conviction under the MBTA
for taking migratory birds by accidentally poisoning a retaining pond
frequented by migratory birds.99 The Second Circuit’s decision in FMC
Corp. expanded the interpretation of a “taking” under the MBTA to include
unintentional takings or killings of migratory birds.100 The court noted
cases involving MBTA violations by hunters, although not apposite, had
consistently held it was not necessary for the government to prove a
defendant violated the MBTA “with guilty knowledge or specific intent to
commit the violation.”101 The Second Circuit held strict criminal liability
was properly imposed, rejecting FMC’s argument that there must be intent
to “take” or “kill” birds culminating in their deaths in order for a
conviction.102
More recently, the issue of the application of the MBTA to non-hunting
conduct has been further analyzed in United States v. Moon Lake Electric
Ass’n.103 In Moon Lake, the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado was faced with the question of whether the MBTA applied to the
deaths of protected migratory birds that were electrocuted by the
defendant’s power poles.104 Unlike the Ninth Circuit, which held the
MBTA only prohibits activities associated with hunting and poaching,105
the Moon Lake court held the language of the MBTA was intended to
prohibit activities beyond those normally associated with hunting and
poaching.106 The court stated, “[i]f Congress intended to proscribe only

96. Id. at 536.
97. Corcoran & Colbourn, supra note 34, at 387.
98. 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978).
99. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 903.
100. Id. at 908.
101. Id. at 906.
102. Id. at 906, 908.
103. 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Colo. 1999).
104. Moon Lake, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1071.
105. See discussion supra Part II.B.
106. Moon Lake, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1074.
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capture[s], injur[ies], and deaths that occur as a result of conduct associated
with hunting or poaching, Congress could have said so.”107
In Moon Lake, the defendant argued extending the MBTA’s
prohibitions beyond activities associated with hunting and poaching would
cause “absurd results.”108 Rather than relying on prosecutorial discretion to
ensure the MBTA prosecution did not “offend reason and common sense,”
the Moon Lake court stated a “proximate cause” standard could ensure the
MBTA remains in its proper confines by requiring the Government to
demonstrate proximate cause to obtain a guilty verdict.109 The court stated,
“[b]ecause the death of a protected bird is generally not a probable
consequence of driving an automobile, piloting an airplane . . . or living in a
residential dwelling with a picture window, such activities would not
normally result in liability under § 707(a) . . . .”110
III. ANALYSIS
In United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P.,111 the United States
District Court for the District of North Dakota found oil development and
production activities, such as the use of reserve pits, are “not the sort of
physical conduct engaged in by hunters and poachers,” and as a result, these
activities are not prohibited by the MBTA.112 In order to reach this
decision, the court separated its analysis into three different parts. 113 First,
the court examined the “key statutory language” of the MBTA to determine
the appropriate interpretation of the MBTA’s ambiguous term “take.”114
Second, the court compared the case to other jurisdictions that addressed
similar questions of interpretation and application.115 Third, by utilizing a
reductio ad absurdum116 argument, the court argued extending the MBTA to
reach activities that indirectly result in the deaths of migratory birds would
“yield absurd results.”117

107. Id. at 1075.
108. Id. at 1084.
109. Id. at 1084-85.
110. Id.
111. 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (D.N.D. 2012).
112. Brigham Oil, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1211.
113. See id. at 1208-12.
114. Id. at 1208-09.
115. Id. at 1209-10.
116. “Reductio ad absurdum” is used in logic to disprove “an argument by showing that it
leads to a ridiculous conclusion.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1089 (9th ed. 2010).
117. Brigham Oil, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1212.
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A. STATUTORY ANALYSIS OF THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT
Due to the ambiguous nature of the MBTA’s term “take,” the court
examined the statutory language of the MBTA to determine its appropriate
interpretation and application.118 The court stated, because the MBTA does
not define “take,” the court would “construe a term according to its ordinary
meaning.”119 To establish this ordinary meaning, the court referred to the
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, which defines “take” as “to
get into one’s hands or into one’s possession, power, or control by force or
stratagem . . . to get possession of (as fish or game) by killing or
capturing.”120
Similarly, the court examined the definition of “take” found in the
MBTA’s implementing regulations.121 According to 50 C.F.R. § 10.12,122
“take” means “to pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect,
or attempt to purse, hunt, shoot . . . or collect.”123 The court found the
regulation’s use of these actions words “reinforce[] the dictionary
definition, and confirm[] that ‘take’ does not refer to accidental activity or
the unintended results of other conduct.”124 As a result, the court held “[i]n
the context of the [MBTA], ‘take’ refers to conduct directed at birds, such
as hunting and poaching, and not acts or omissions having merely the
incidental or unintended effect of causing bird deaths.”125
B. RELEVANT CASE LAW AND THE APPLICATION OF
THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT
In Brigham Oil, the court utilized the analysis of previous decisions to
reach its determination, holding oil and gas production activities, which
resulted in the unintentional deaths of migratory birds, did not constitute an
illegal “take” under the MBTA.126 While the court focused primarily on the
controlling Eighth Circuit precedent, it was also influenced by numerous
decisions outside of the Eighth Circuit, which discussed the interpretation
and application of the MBTA.127 In each of these cases, the various courts
118. Id. at 1208-09.
119. Id. at 1208.
120. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2329-30 (2005).
121. Brigham Oil, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1209.
122. 50 C.F.R. §§ 10.12 to .13 (2011).
123. Brigham Oil, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1209.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1208.
126. Id. at 1209-10.
127. Id. at 1209; see also Curry v. U.S. Forest Serv., 988 F. Supp. 541, 543 (W.D. Pa. 1997)
(holding that the MBTA was not the proper statutory basis upon which to contest a Forest Service
timber sale and concluding that the loss of migratory birds as a result of logging operations did not
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determined lawful commercial activities, such as logging or oil and gas
production activities, are excluded from the reach of the MBTA’s
prohibitions.128
First in its decision, the Brigham Oil court cited Newton County, and
stated its precedential value in the Eighth Circuit.129 Next, the Brigham Oil
court examined Seattle Audubon Society, which was partially relied on by
the Newton County court.130 Finally, the court examined the District of
New Mexico’s decision to exclude evaporation pits, which indirectly
caused the deaths of migratory birds, from the reach of the MBTA. By
analogizing the holdings of these cases, the Brigham Oil court expanded the
holding of Newton County to exclude commercial activity by oil and gas
producers from the prohibition of the MBTA and refused to interpret the
MBTA as a strict liability statute.131
C. EFFECTS OF EXPANSIVE APPLICATIONS OF
THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT
Rather than relying on the “proximate cause” application of the MBTA
suggested in Moon Lake, the Brigham Oil court employed a reductio ad
absurdum argument to prove the extension of the MBTA would “yield
absurd results.”132 The court stated if the MBTA were interpreted to
prohibit any activity that “proximately results in the death of a migratory
bird,” then many common activities would become unlawful when they
result in the death of any migratory bird.”133 For example, the court argued
an expansive application of the MBTA would allow for the criminalization
of many ordinary activities such as driving a vehicle, owning a building
with windows, or owning a cat because these activities have been reported
to result in the deaths of migratory birds.134
As a result of the possible absurd consequences of expanding the
application of the MBTA, the court found it is “highly unlikely” that
Congress intended to impose criminal liability on lawful commercial

constitute a taking under the MBTA); Mahler v. United States, 927 F. Supp. 1559, 1561 (E.D. Ind.
1996) (holding that indirect taking of migratory birds as a result of habitat destruction did not fall
within the MBTA).
128. Brigham Oil, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1209.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1211 (citing Newton Cnty. Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 115
(8th Cir. 1997)).
132. Id. at 1212.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1213.
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activity, which indirectly causes migratory bird deaths.135 Further, the court
held “[j]ust as in the case of driving, flying or farming, the MBTA cannot
reasonably be read to criminalize the legal operation of a reserve pit at an
oil exploration site.”136
IV. IMPACT
Although this decision does not constitute new case law regarding the
applicability of the MBTA and its prohibitions, it is significant because it
expands the holding of existing Eighth Circuit precedent to exclude
commercial activity by oil and gas producers from the prohibitions of the
MBTA.137 In addition, Brigham Oil contributes to the split amongst the
circuits regarding the unresolved question of proper interpretation and
application of the MBTA in cases involving lawful commercial activity that
indirectly results in the taking of migratory birds.138 With the recent oil
boom in North Dakota, the extent and importance of the MBTA’s
prohibitions, particularly their application to activities outside the context of
domestic hunting or poaching, will become more important as their
outcomes will likely have a considerable impact on the regulatory
environment the oil and gas companies will be subjected to.139
A. THE ISSUE OF PROPER INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
THE MBTA’S TERM “TAKE” IS UNRESOLVED
Shortly after Brigham Oil was decided, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas, in United States v. CITGO Petroleum
Corp.,140 declined to follow the holding in Brigham Oil and its application
of the MBTA.141 In CITGO Petroleum Corp., the defendant oil company
was convicted of unlawfully taking migratory birds after ten birds were
found in the company’s “open-top tanks.”142 Despite the oil company’s
attempt to persuade the court to vacate the previous conviction based upon
the holding of Brigham Oil, the court dismissed the motion to vacate.143
The court stated, “[b]ased on the evidence . . . not only was it reasonably
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See supra Part II.B.
138. Id.
139. See Corcoran & Colbourn, supra note 34, at 401.
140. No. C-06-563, 2012 WL 3866857, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 2012).
141. CITGO Petrol. Corp., 2012 WL 3866857, at *8.
142. Id. at *1. CITGO complained that to hold it strictly liable under the MBTA and extend
the statute “to reach other activities that indirectly result in the deaths of covered birds would yield
absurd results.” Id. at *4.
143. Id. at *8.
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foreseeable that protected migratory birds might become trapped in the
layers of oil on top of Tanks 116 and 117, CITGO was aware that this was
happening for years and did nothing to stop it.”144 This decision to decline
the interpretation and application of the MBTA set forth in Brigham Oil
highlights the controversial and unresolved question of determining the
proper scope of the MBTA in regard to commercial activity that results in
the deaths of migratory birds.
B. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION TO ENSURE UNIFORM
APPLICATION OF THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT
Due to the confusion and inconsistency surrounding the interpretation
and application of the MBTA, it has become evident that both federal and
state legislative action is needed to ensure courts are able to interpret and
apply the MBTA in a uniform manner. In Brigham Oil, the United States
District Court for the District of North Dakota stated “[i]f there is a desire
on the part of Congress to criminalize commercial activity that incidentally
injures migratory birds protected under the [MBTA], it may certainly do so
– but the criminal laws should be clear and certain.”145 This ability to
criminalize commercial activity that results in the deaths of migratory birds,
could be easily achieved by amending the MBTA to closely model the
definition of “take” under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), which is
defined broadly to include the term “harm.”146
According to its regulations, the term “harm” under the ESA definition
of “take” means any act, such as habitat destruction, which actually kills or
injures wildlife.147 By amending the MBTA’s definition of “take” to
include activities that “harm” migratory birds, Congress can alleviate the
confusion surrounding the various applications of the MBTA in regard to
the criminalization of commercial activity that indirectly or unintentionally
causes the death of migratory birds. In addition, by amending the MBTA to
mirror the ESA’s definition of “take,” courts will ensure uniform
application of the MBTA throughout the federal circuit courts.
In addition to federal efforts to amend and extend the MBTA in order
to criminalize commercial activity that results in the deaths of migratory
birds, legislative action is needed from the states as well. For example,
Texas, a state familiar with oil and gas production activities and their

144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d. 1202, 1211 (D.N.D. 2012).
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2006).
50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2011).
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effects,148 has implemented strict state regulation of oil and gas production
activities and their impacts on the environment and wildlife.149 The Texas
Administrative Code specifically states an operator, who “does not take
protective measures necessary to prevent harm to birds” will be subjected to
liability under “federal and state wildlife protection laws” such as the
MBTA.150 In CITGO Petroleum Corp., the court made reference to this
influential state regulation in its decision to deny CITGO’s motion to vacate
previous convictions for violations of the MBTA.151
Unlike Texas, North Dakota’s oil industry is still “in its infancy” and
its state laws are far more relaxed with regard to the liability of oil and gas
companies when their actions cause the death of migratory birds.152
Despite this infancy, the need for strict regulations of the oil and gas
industry to protect the state and its resources is becoming more apparent.153
In Brigham Oil, oil companies were able to avoid liability for the unlawful
takings of migratory birds because the court ruled the migratory bird deaths
resulted indirectly from “lawful commercial activity.”154 In order to ensure
oil and gas companies in North Dakota are held liable for their actions in
the future, the North Dakota Legislature should consider amending the
state’s laws and regulations in a manner consistent with Texas law. As a
result, oil and gas companies in North Dakota would be required by law to
take preventative measures to protect migratory birds, and would be
subjected to federal and state wildlife protection laws for failure to do so.155
V. CONCLUSION
In Brigham Oil, the District Court of North Dakota found, in the
context of statutory language of the MBTA, “take” refers to conduct
directed at birds, such as hunting and poaching, and not acts or omissions
having merely the incidental or unintended effect of causing migratory bird
deaths.156 Conversely, the court held oil development activities, such as the
148. Oil was discovered in Texas on January 1, 1901. Oil and Texas: A Cultural History,
TEXAS ALMANAC, http://www.texasalmanac.com/topics/business/oil-and-texas-cultural-history
(last visited Nov. 4, 2012).
149. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.22(b)(1) (1991).
150. Id. § 3.22(a).
151. United States v. CITGO Petrol. Corp., No. C-06-563, 2012 WL 3866857, at *6 (S.D.
Tex. Sept. 5, 2012).
152. Maugeri, supra note 16, at 3.
153. Nicholas Kusnetz, North Dakota’s Oil Boom Brings Damage Along with Prosperity,
PROPUBLICA (June 7, 2012, 10:47 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/the-other-frackingnorth-dakotas-oil-boom-brings-damage-along-with-prosperi.
154. United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d. 1202, 1211 (D.N.D. 2012).
155. See 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.22(a).
156. Brigham Oil, 840 F. Supp. 2d. at 1211.
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use of reserve pits, are not the sort of physical conduct engaged in by
hunters and poachers and such activities do not fall under the prohibitions
of the MBTA.157 The Brigham Oil decision contributes to the split in the
federal courts of appeals regarding the unresolved question of proper
interpretation and application of the MBTA in cases involving lawful
commercial activity that indirectly results in the taking of migratory
birds.158
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